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1 INTRODUCTION
In Nepal, the adult entertainment sector (AES) is 
perceived as a high-risk environment for children where 
sexual exploitation is known to occur (Frederick, Basnyet 
and Aguettant 2010). Commercial sexual exploitation of 
children (CSEC) is always considered one of the worst 
forms of child labour.1 This Working Paper is part of 
CLARISSA, a consortium of organisations committed to 
building a strong evidence base and generate innovative 
solutions to the worst forms of child labour in Bangladesh, 
Myanmar and Nepal.2
The AES is made up of a diverse range of venues that 
includes restaurants, folk dance bars (known as dohoris3), 
erotic dance bars, massage parlours, guest houses, 
and hotels. Several studies have examined the causes, 
frequency, and responses to CSEC in Kathmandu. 
The numbers of children estimated to be involved in 
sexual exploitation in the AES vary (MoWCSW 2008; 
Frederick et al. 2010). Earlier estimates based on 
research conducted over ten years ago suggested that a 
substantial proportion – over one third – of sex workers 
were minors (Shakti Samuha and Free the Slaves 2008). 
More recent research has found the absolute number of 
minors to be less than 2,000, representing 17 per cent 
of those working in the sector (Dank et al. 2019). Some 
studies have found high numbers of minors from ethnic 
minorities (Frederick et al. 2010: 36). Those involved in 
the AES live all over Nepal, including Kathmandu Valley. 
Social norms are important in the (re)enforcement and 
(re)production of the material and structural realities 
which have resulted in the involvement of children in 
the AES. Social norms, also called societal or cultural 
norms (Gelfand and Jackson 2016), are unwritten 
rules shared by people in a given society or group that 
define appropriate actions for the members of that 
1 Children also perform dangerous tasks in the production of bricks, carpets, embellished textiles, and stones  
(see www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods).
2 CLARISSA is working with partners in Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Nepal to identify ways in which children’s options to avoid 
engagement in hazardous, exploitative labour can be increased. Core partners are Terre des hommes, ChildHope, and the 
Consortium for Street Children. 
3 A dohori is a venue that offers traditional folk music and dance. Most of them serve liquor and food, which can be light snacks or 
full meals. There is variation between the many dohoris. We use the term ‘dohori sector’ to describe this diverse group of venues.
4 An exception to this neglect of what perpetrators think is the work of Choi-Fitzpatrick; see Choi-Fitzpatrick (2017). 
group (Cislaghi and Heise 2018; Cislaghi and Shakya 
2018; Elster 1989). To understand the reasons why 
CSEC exists in the adult entertainment sector, this 
Working Paper explores the social norms and material 
and structural realities of the AES and the employment 
trajectories of minors into this sector. It focuses 
particularly on labour intermediaries – both formal and 
informal – in intentionally or unintentionally supporting the 
employment of minors in the AES. CSEC is considered 
one of the worst forms of child labour (WFCL) and WFCL 
is a subset of modern slavery. Research on modern 
slavery shows that high-interest informal moneylending 
and the provision of advances by labour intermediaries 
can play important roles in some forms of modern slavery. 
The research therefore also briefly explored whether 
moneylenders played similar roles in CSEC. Through the 
scoping the authors hope to gain a better understanding 
of the social norms, the stakeholders, and the political 
economy of the AES in order to develop innovative and 
realistic interventions on CSEC that can be scaled up and 
supported by key stakeholders. 
There is an acute scarcity of research which looks 
at perpetrators (Oosterhoff et al. 2018),4 who are the 
targets of interventions on WFCL and modern slavery. 
It is not clear who are the people involved in the labour 
trajectories that end with children involved in CSEC: for 
example, what their aspirations are and if and when they 
act with the full knowledge of the consequences of their 
involvement. A lack of understanding of the motivations 
and norms of these actors hinders the development of 
interventions. This Working Paper reports on two scoping 
visits to inform a multi-year mixed-methods participatory 
research programme on WFCL in Nepal. The insights 
from this scoping will help us to unpack and decide 
if, how, and who can be involved in the CLARISSA 
programme to reduce CSEC. 
Section 2:
THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF KATHMANDU’S 
AES
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2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
KATHMANDU’S AES 
Hospitality and entertainment are relatively new and 
growing sectors in Kathmandu, developing rapidly since 
the 1980s when international aid and trade relations led to 
the growth of a consumer economy and the development 
of a consumer culture (Liechty 2005). Not all venues in 
the AES are exploitative or engage children in sexual 
services. Some of the venues cater primarily to families 
or tourists seeking food and entertainment. However, the 
sector has developed in response to increased demand 
for entertainment from a growing urban (particularly male) 
population engaging in a more consumer-based economy. 
At the same time, the AES provides employment for 
women and girls in a context where alternative work 
opportunities have been limited. Within this setting, social 
norms around gender, masculinity, food and alcohol, 
and entertainment (including ‘traditional’ performative 
culture) have contributed to sexual services and CSEC in 
particular being associated with Kathmandu’s AES. These 
factors are discussed in more detail below. 
Nepal has one of the highest migration rates in the world. 
High levels of male migration, including men from rural 
areas with limited economic opportunities who depart 
or return from the Gulf and other foreign countries such 
as Malaysia, the Maldives, and South Korea, have 
profoundly changed gender relations (Kaspar 2006; 
Reisman 2018). It has also contributed to a wide variety 
of venues primarily catering to male customers seeking 
music, food, drinks, and (female) companionship. In 
addition, the rapid increase in rural-to-urban migrants who 
often reside in cities without a family has added to the 
demand for such urban entertainment (MoUD 2016).
At the same time, social norms around entertainment 
and alcohol consumption have been changing with the 
growth of a more consumer-based economy. Nepal, like 
other parts of South Asia, has a complex relationship 
with alcohol. Alcohol is traditionally regarded as ‘polluted’ 
or tainted among Hindus belonging to ‘high castes’ and 
is also contested among Muslims. Yet the proliferation 
of adult entertainment venues has offered new, male-
dominated spaces providing opportunities for the public 
consumption of what was previously taboo: alcohol, 
cigarettes, meat, and in addition, sexual services (Liechty 
2005). A growing culture of alcohol consumption has 
been met by increased restrictions from the government; 
for example, recent measures have been introduced 
to reduce alcohol abuse such as banning alcohol 
advertisements (The Kathmandu Post 2018b). 
A rapidly increasing urban population, particularly men 
without families, seeking entertainment is a pattern which 
is seen across the whole subcontinent. The AES offers 
entertainment for adults, some of which involves singing 
and dancing, in a context where there has been limited 
state involvement in supporting modern performative arts 
such as music and theatre. This reflects a discomfort with 
some forms of modern entertainment among political 
and religious elites (The Kathmandu Post 2018a) and 
has resulted in Kathmandu having very few modern 
performance arts venues for a capital city. Performance 
artists – both traditional and modern – have needed to 
support themselves. With few other options available, many 
performers have turned to the less mainstream venues 
of the AES where there are performances in ‘Bollywood’ 
dance bars or ‘traditional’ Nepali music in dohoris. The 
quality of these performances and background of the 
performers is very diverse, as is the audience. 
There are examples of entertainment being instrumentalised 
and politicised across the subcontinent; for example, some 
prominent ‘Bollywood’ entertainers have been linked with a 
specific type of highly contested Hindu nationalism (Schultz 
2019). Within the AES, perceptions of the traditional 
and more modern ‘Bollywood’ style of entertainment 
have impacted on the development of the sector and its 
association with sex work. Perceptions of traditions – 
particularly ‘traditional dancing or singing’ – as being ancient 
often ignore its complex history and the dynamic socio-
political and economic constructions which are often linked 
to norms about sexuality and gender. Support or lack of 
support of ‘traditional’ music is not necessarily non-political: 
the selection and content of some traditions over others is 
related to power and inclusion of some groups in relation to 
others. But the conflation of ‘traditional’ music with sex work 
by various stakeholders in specific neighbourhoods, and the 
use of umbrella terms such as ‘AES’ (with which traditional 
music is often associated) is a development observed 
across the border in India, as well as in Nepal. 
The conflation of traditional music with the AES and 
sex work in a context where sex work is illegal has 
myriad implications. Traditional performers can have 
difficulties competing with a ‘Bollywood’-influenced style 
of entertainment, and traditional music can be seen as 
inferior by clients encouraging impoverished artists to 
offer something else. This is happening with Muslim 
entertainers in Muzaffarpur (Bihar, India) with a proud 
and long Muslim traditional music history, and with the 
Devadasis (female temple dancers) in South India. 
Traditional music can also become a disguise or space 
for sex workers, as it has in Cambodia (Overs 2013). 
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Neither situation is helpful for the development of 
professional adult musical entertainment, creating instead 
shady half-legal spaces in which abuses – including 
CSEC and sexual harassment of staff – can flourish.
Within the AES, CSEC could not flourish without tacit 
or explicit support from employers and customers. 
Qualitative research based on in-depth interviews with the 
owners, managers, and customers of the venues where 
CSEC takes place, shows a widespread prevalence 
and acceptance of a culture that permits and justifies 
exploitation, including the sexual harassment of young 
girls. At the same time, sex with children violates social 
norms around gender, sexuality, and children. To explain 
this cultural cognitive dissonance and to justify their 
morally reprehensible behaviour, different actors involved 
in the AES (owners, managers, customers, workers), 
create social narratives which blame other groups of 
actors for the exploitation of children. Phrases such as 
‘Naya Keti’ [new girl] or ‘Comfort Girl’ are social innuendos 
used in these settings to make asking for a girl a socially 
acceptable way to be flirtatious. These social narratives 
allow individuals to normalise their behaviour and 
make it possible to evade any responsibility for CSEC, 
creating a psychological and emotional distance from the 
implications of their actions (Risal and Hacker 2018). 
The structural changes to society due to migration trends 
and a more modern economy led to the development of 
new spaces where predominantly male consumers could 
transgress existing norms associated with caste and kin, 
including those around alcohol, food, and sex. At the 
same time as certain norms were being transgressed, 
other norms (particularly those pertaining to women and 
girls) were ‘carried over’ or reinforced in the AES. A lack 
of support for performance artists and the way in which it 
has been associated with sex work, and the development 
of a culture that tolerates the harassment and sexual 
exploitation of women and girls reflects broader unequal 
gender norms. The social norms which justify the sexual 
exploitation of minors and shift the blame of CSEC to the 
victims clearly need to be challenged.
2.1 Women and girls in the AES
It is important to have a good understanding of gender 
norms when examining work in the AES. The majority of 
5 Sex workers – male or female – are considered a key population central to reducing the spread of HIV through risky sexual 
behaviour (WHO 2012).
6 Dolly Parton’s 9 to 5 is a global hit (www.youtube.com/watch?v=UbxUSsFXYo4). It has also been played by female presidential 
candidates like Hillary Clinton and Elizabeth Warren. 
7 See www.tenement.org/tenement-women-agents-of-change/
workers in the AES are women and girls, but there are 
many different types of work in and around AES venues 
that are performed by men and boys, such as bouncers 
and touts. There are boys who engage in sex work 
both voluntarily and involuntarily.5 Research shows that 
women working in entertainment services have a higher 
HIV infection rate than the general population, which 
is an indication of risky sexual behaviour (Thuy et al. 
2000). They may not consider themselves commercial or 
professional sex workers. Men who have sex with men 
also have a higher HIV infection rate. The HIV epidemic 
is one of the reasons why sexuality is on the development 
agenda – and this medical lens has justified a focus on 
medical risk and diseases – less on the political-economy 
and relational aspects of sexuality (Oosterhoff, Waldman 
and Olerenshaw 2014). HIV prevalence and incidence 
rates in and by themselves do not tell us anything about 
if and how and who among these workers has given 
sexual consent.
Sexual harassment and unequal treatment – including 
unequal pay for women who enter the urban workforce – is 
not unique to Nepal. It is well documented in countries like 
the USA by historians and lamented by musicians such as 
Dolly Parton.6 Much has been said about the exploitation of 
migrant women working for low pay in factories. Recently, 
feminist scholars and journalists have re-examined some 
of the victimising narratives relating to working women 
and girls, shown in major exhibitions on urbanisation 
and women.7 Women and girls who migrate for work 
face unfamiliar risks, but there can also be a sense of 
independence and excitement associated with making 
this choice (Chang 2009). Portrayals of changes to sexual 
norms resulting from urbanisation and modernisation as 
a social tragedy and a medical risk, such as narratives 
around the vulnerability of young women to HIV, are 
countered by more liberating sexual narratives (Phinney 
2008). In Nepal, sex work is illegal and often conflated 
with trafficking (Frederick et al. 2010). Similar legislation 
that conflates sex work and trafficking exists elsewhere, 
for example in India, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. This 
conflation means that voluntary sex workers are at risk of 
being involuntarily rescued and is an important obstacle 
for the organisation of sex workers to increase their safety 
from harassment, extortion, and other forms of abuse (Pai, 
Seshu and Murthy 2018; Overs 2013). 
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Harassment of waitresses and female staff working in 
hospitality is also well known in Europe and the USA 
(Hackman 2017; Giuffre and Williams 1994; Huebner 
2008). Some behaviour at the workplace which might 
have been acceptable until recently is increasingly viewed 
as sexual harassment in many countries (Zarkov and 
Davis 2018; Roy 2019). In Nepal, as in other countries in 
Asia such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand (Webber 
et al. 2012), working in a poorly regulated AES can lead 
many girls and young women to a gradual or forced 
familiarisation with, and immersion in, the sex industry. 
2.2 Trajectories into the AES
Understanding the trajectories of minors into the AES 
where they may become involved in the associated sex 
industry is essential. Although criminal networks that 
traffic women and girls using physical force (including 
rape) exist in Nepal, as they do elsewhere (Smith and 
Smith 2011), research suggests that their role as labour 
intermediaries in the AES is limited. Girls reported that 
they were invited to join or had found work in the AES 
through friends or relatives rather than through these 
more formal ‘labour intermediaries’ or ‘brokers’ as one 
would find, for example, in international migration for 
construction to the Gulf states or elsewhere (Yunus 2020). 
A recent study shows that the majority of young people 
were connected to their job in the AES through someone 
they knew: friends (35 per cent), family members (23 per 
cent), or neighbours (11 per cent) (Dank et al. 2019). In a 
different study, several owners and managers pointed out 
that while the AES was subject to laws and regulations, 
the real issue was actors operating informally outside 
the actual venues. They reported that these ‘guides’ 
or ‘gatekeepers’ acting independently from the venues 
recruited women into sex work, or that girls would arrange 
to meet privately with customers themselves (Risal and 
Hacker 2018). These studies highlight the importance of 
informal recruitment strategies that lead women and girls 
into the AES and the related sex industry. 
In Nepal, borrowing money is widespread in areas with 
agricultural bonded labour – among families both with and 
without members in bondage (Oosterhoff, Sharma and 
Burns 2017; Shakti Samuha and Free the Slaves 2008). 
Many families with a member in bondage are in debt to 
moneylenders or have taken advance payments and 
have to repay their debt to the moneylender by working 
for them for less than the minimum wage. They are often 
threatened with violence and have no alternative source 
of income (Oosterhoff 2019a, 2019b). Moneylenders, who 
provide informal loans at high interest, justify their inflated 
rates by citing the high risks of default and their clients’ 
lack of assets.
While stories of people who lose everything to 
moneylenders can be found throughout South Asia, 
for the poor, they may also offer convenient, personal, 
and flexible ways to access credit (Dank et al. 2019; 
Oosterhoff and Sharma 2018; Ghate 2015; Aliber 
2015; Parussini 2015; Thomas 1992; Idris 2020). Both 
moneylenders and labour intermediaries may operate 
informally (and illegally) under the guise of a shopkeeper, 
landowner or family friend; both are seen by the poor as 
people who are providing valuable services. 
Nonetheless, studies have shown that debts and 
advances play important roles in modern slavery, 
especially in bondage (Oosterhoff et al. 2019a, 
2019b; Oosterhoff, Sharma and Burns 2020). Several 
community-based responses to reduce bondage have 
set up credit and savings groups to tackle the reliance 
on moneylenders. But credit and savings groups can 
and do coexist with moneylenders – and a systematic 
literature review found no studies on interventions on 
moneylending to reduce the prevalence of modern 
slavery. Therefore, to help with designing interventions, 
CLARISSA commissioned a broader literature review on 
interventions that aim to combat high-interest informal 
moneylending in the intervention countries (Idris 2020). 
Most young people report to researchers that they enter the 
AES voluntarily (Dank et al. 2019). Consent is a complex and 
contested issue, and minors’ agency may be constrained due 
to their age and lack of opportunities to support themselves 
and their families. However, young people do have a voice 
and the ability to make decisions, and programmes with 
a child-centred approach need to take the perspectives of 
minors into account. This Working Paper focuses on the role 
of moneylenders and labour intermediaries in intentionally or 
unintentionally supporting the employment of minors in the 
AES. In this scoping, we probed whether high-interest loans 
by informal moneylenders play a role in CSEC and should 
therefore be part of the intervention design. Rather than 
assuming that moneylenders and intermediaries are acting 
unscrupulously by exploiting minors who have no agency 
and no ability to give consent, we explore the motivations of 
minors, their parents, and these intermediaries to enter into 
these relations. We assume that people have constrained 
agency and that people are innocent until proven guilty. In 
order to design an effective response to CSEC, a better 
understanding of the stakeholders in the political economy 
which (re)enforce the norms that lead children into work in 
the AES is essential. 
Section 3:
APPROACH AND 
METHOD 
Social Norms, Labour Intermediaries, and Trajectories of 
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3 APPROACH AND METHOD
This Working Paper is informed by a systematic literature 
review (Oosterhoff et al. 2018), literature on prevalence of 
WFCL,8 purposive literature reviews of observational and 
qualitative recent research on the AES in Nepal, and our 
own research and experiential knowledge of Nepal and 
the topic in Asia gained over two decades. These insights 
helped to contextualise the data and two scoping visits in 
Nepal with programme partners Voice of Children (VOC) 
and Terre des hommes in February and November 2019. 
The scoping missions were commissioned by the 
CLARISSA work stream on social norms. The initial 
choice of the work stream to explore the AES as an area 
of focus in Nepal is underpinned by the fact that CSEC 
is one of the worst forms of child labour. Secondly, there 
is a legal framework for addressing WFCL in Nepal 
in which the AES is recognised, and there is room for 
improving the implementation. Thirdly, Nepal has a 
number of policies which show a political commitment to 
children, gender equality, and family wellbeing. Finally, 
the partners have relevant experience and networks on 
this topic. Kathmandu was selected because it has the 
largest number of AES venues, spread out across various 
geographical areas within the city (Dank et al. 2019). 
The two scoping visits build upon each other. The first 
scoping visit aimed to (a) help the work stream decide 
whether work in the AES would be feasible and whether 
social norms work is relevant; (b) identify potential 
partners and beneficiaries; and (c) scope areas where 
programme activities could be developed in Kathmandu. 
The second scoping visit focused on AES source 
communities: it aimed to (a) improve understanding of the 
8 We have used data from ILO, UNICEF, and the US Department of Labor to identify sectors and lists of goods and narrow down 
the locations that we can work in. Forced labour involving the state will be outside the reach of the work stream – and perhaps the 
consortium to address.
political economy and social norms on moneylending and 
labour brokering that justify or reward choices which result 
in minors working in the AES; (b) gain an understanding 
of whether the trajectories of customers, employers, and 
(minor-aged) workers into the AES are similar or different 
from other sectors with reported forced child labour; and 
(c) assess whether action research could be undertaken 
on moneylending and labour intermediaries safely, and if 
so, how. This would build on insights from interventions to 
reduce child labour previously undertaken in Nepal that 
might not have been documented.
During these two scoping visits we conducted over 75 
individual interviews with policymakers, non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) practitioners, law enforcement 
agents, survivors of CSEC, labour intermediaries, and 
owners of entertainment venues and brick kilns. Almost 
all interviews were conducted in Nepali, with ten in 
English (usually mixed with some Nepali), and two in 
Hindi. Survivors, all female, refused to be interviewed by 
men, reflecting experiences of other researchers working 
on sensitive topics in Nepal (Axinn 1991). Observations 
were conducted in AES hotspot areas and brick kilns, and 
participatory social norms and social norm benefit and 
cost analysis mapping exercises were conducted with 
groups of workers and survivors of CSEC (who are now 
over 18 years old). These were facilitated in rehabilitation 
centres and other safe spaces with the support of NGO 
employees and other stakeholders. 
For both visits a joint data analysis with the international 
team was undertaken, before presenting preliminary 
results to key stakeholders in Kathmandu for their 
feedback and additional analysis. 
Section 4:
RESULTS
Social Norms, Labour Intermediaries, and Trajectories of 
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4 RESULTS
4.1 Kathmandu’s AES
The scoping visits highlighted the complexity and 
fragmented nature of the AES in Kathmandu. The capital 
has a number of distinct AES areas, each with its own 
character and price levels depending on the clientele 
that visit the particular area. For example, in Thamel, a 
major tourist area, venues are generally more expensive, 
whereas Bhalaju, due to its position next to Kathmandu’s 
main bus station, attracts clients who are leaving for and 
returning from employment abroad. 
Within each area there are different types of venues, 
mostly small and medium-sized businesses, that are all 
broadly categorised under the umbrella term ‘AES’. Some 
of these facilitate CSEC, but the term AES is used for 
many different types of venues. The owners may also 
manage the venues (reflecting the relatively small scale 
of many businesses in the sector) and establishments 
often have between three and five managers or owners. 
Venues include, but are not limited to, dance bars, cabin 
restaurants,9 dohori restaurants, khajaghars (snack 
restaurants), hotels, and guest houses. Each caters to 
the specific subgroup (or requirements of the subgroup) 
within that particular area. 
Some services offered in these areas, such as selling 
grilled meat, also take place in many other parts of town 
that are not associated with the AES. However, other 
services are specific to AES areas; for example at transit 
points, touts offering to take arrivals to a hotel, perhaps 
with the promise of female companionship, are common. 
Touting or selling drugs – hustling – provides an income 
to young men and boys, some of whom may be homeless 
or in unsettled lodging arrangements. This hustling 
can be related to CSEC when young boys are used as 
messengers to advertise CSEC venues and services and 
act as a link person to the clients, but they may not know 
that certain venues offer CSEC.
Within a venue, clients have a variety of choices: food, 
hookahs, and drinks (alcoholic and non-alcoholic) are 
served in many establishments, often at inflated prices. 
In some establishments girls are expected to drink and 
smoke with clients. The same building may house a 
number of different AES venues, each floor offering a 
different kind of entertainment: at street level or in front 
of the building, a khajaghar may serve grilled food, 
9 A cabin restaurant is usually a small restaurant with small, private sections that allow customers privacy. Services include being 
entertained by waitresses with flirting and touching.
whilst dohoris and exotic dance bars occupy the higher 
storeys. The entertainment on offer is varied: in a dance 
bar it is possible to see girls wearing traditional Nepali 
costume lip sync and move to the rhythm, followed by a 
hip-hop act of two girls with tattoos and piercings in silver 
space outfits. Meanwhile, in the dohori restaurant, girls 
dressed in ethnic costumes perform gut-wrenching songs 
of (failed) migration, accompanied by traditional Nepali 
live music. Some dohori performers are highly skilled 
performers, able to spontaneously create lyrics based on 
basic personal information provided by clients sitting at 
the tables. Both exotic dance bars and dohoris are open 
early in the evening, but most clients visit after 9pm, and 
in some places after 11pm, till 3am. 
This has practical implications for programmes that 
aim to eradicate WFCL in these areas. NGO workers, 
researchers or government officials have to work well 
beyond office hours to understand what is going on in this 
area when a lot of the action is happening. Being seen as 
NGO staff in these areas can also bring other risks such 
as to their security and reputation. And while large hotels 
or restaurants in Kathmandu might be organised and 
registered there is a lack of formal organisation of these 
very different smaller and often more informal venues. 
Increased connectivity is changing the ways of recruiting 
girls into work and of interacting with clients, offering 
potentially discrete ways of meeting up, but also bringing 
new dimensions to off-line risks such as sextortion and 
control by boyfriends or self-appointed pimps. 
4.2 The trajectory of girls and women 
into the AES and CSEC
Social norms across different stakeholders, including 
children, parents, employers, customers, government 
agencies, and law enforcement bodies, support the idea 
that migration is a way out of poverty: children migrate 
to contribute to the family income. At the same time, 
children’s employment as sex workers is unacceptable 
(discussed further below). Stories of women and girls who 
entered sex work as minors revealed complex sets of 
circumstances that led to girls being involved in the AES 
and CSEC: for example, girls from poor, marginalised, 
and broken families, whose circumstances created a 
desire and a need for employment; women who had been 
abandoned by abusive boyfriends, husbands or their own 
families, ending up in Kathmandu where they had to find 
16 Working Paper 1
Social Norms, Labour Intermediaries, and Trajectories of  
Minors in Kathmandu’s Adult Entertainment Industry
a place to stay and the means to live; and very young 
girls (as young as nine) from rehabilitation centres, who 
were involved in CSEC. 
I married my husband when I was 14. I came 
to Kathmandu to escape the violence in the 
countryside. I stayed with my brother in Kathmandu 
and worked in a factory. I met my husband in a 
restaurant nearby. My parents agreed but it was 
against the will of my brother. I got pregnant and he 
put me to work in a bar. I found out he had several 
other women and left him and needed more money 
so I looked for ways to get it. That’s how I ended up 
doing other things. (Survivor CSEC) 
There is a high demand for young girls in general in 
the AES, particularly because turnover can be high as 
venues seek different looks and images: ‘Let me be clear. 
In some places it is all about the looks. No need to be 
able to sing or perform. It is not always and everywhere 
about our artistic talents and abilities’ (dohori worker). 
However, these stories did not support the idea/narrative 
of a directed or deliberate plan by organised criminals to 
groom young women and girls in rural areas to work in 
the capital’s AES. The reality appears more fragmented 
and messy, involving the often fractured and disrupted 
lives of women and girls navigating the challenging 
economic context of rural Nepal. For young girls from 
rural areas, there is a perception (based on reports from 
their peers) that the AES provides an opportunity to earn 
a relatively high income for work that requires no formal 
education. 
In terms of the specific trajectories of young girls 
into the AES, the scoping visits found that the labour 
intermediaries that facilitate girls’ entry into the sector 
are mostly people that are close to the young girls and 
their families; for example, members of their extended 
family. They are usually ‘friends’ rather than strangers. 
During the first scoping visit, most stakeholders described 
a simple trajectory between the source and destination 
communities in which an intermediary facilitated the 
employment of young women and girls (and some boys) 
from a source community to an AES destination in which 
CSEC takes place.
However, further research, particularly with CSEC 
survivors, might suggest that these trajectories are 
more complex. Survivors reported that they had friends 
who helped them find a job in a restaurant or a hotel 
in Kathmandu. They would often be unclear of the 
receiving venue’s expectations or their options until they 
arrived. Following their arrival, they would learn of new 
opportunities through their friends/peers in the AES: 
‘I started cleaning tables. I then asked a girl who was 
singing how to get that job. She helped me’ (AES worker).
I worked cleaning tables. I shared a room in a house 
with a girl who worked in a dohori. She helped me 
get a job to perform. (Dohori worker)
I was stuck in a bad job and poor housing. A friend 
helped me to find a better place to live and a job 
with more money after I got here. I owe her so 
much. She has helped so many of us. (Dohori 
worker)
The second scoping visit in November 2019 built upon 
the findings from the scoping in February 2019. It aimed 
to improve the understanding of the political economy 
in source communities, and the social norms on 
moneylending and labour brokering that validate choices 
which result in minors working in the AES. Prior to the 
field visit, Institute of Development Studies (IDS) and 
VOC staff refined the theory on labour intermediaries 
to reflect a more complex picture of their role between 
source communities and a high-risk AES. It was theorised 
that families in one community would use different labour 
intermediaries for different jobs or for different parts of 
the trajectory. Labour intermediaries are predominantly 
informal in this context: friends, (distant) relatives, 
neighbours. A labour intermediary such as a family 
member or friend may help to find a job in Kathmandu, 
and then a new, separate set of intermediaries (again 
informal) may help to find different work or housing. How 
long an individual stays in a certain venue/job before 
moving on is determined by many factors including looks, 
customer preferences, earnings, and the colleagues in 
their original place of work. 
The scoping team also looked at the role of intermediaries 
in the employment of adults and minors in the brick-
making/kiln sector of Kathmandu Valley, as this offered 
a useful point of comparison to trajectories into the 
AES. Like the AES in Kathmandu, brick kilns are 
reported to have a high number of bonded labourers 
and child labourers (ILO 2017; Child Labor Coalition 
2016). The workers (male and female), employers, and 
labour intermediary we spoke with all reported a more 
straightforward trajectory of workers into brick kilns. 
Porters, brick moulders and shapers, and brick bakers 
are roles carried out by different people with specific 
ethnicities, usually from the same area (often a few 
people coming from the same village). Usually each 
village will have one or more labour intermediaries with 
ties to a particular brick kiln. The seasonal nature of 
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brick making means there is a sudden high demand for 
workers during the dry season. Intermediaries receive 
commissions from the brick kiln employers which they 
use to entice and tie in workers, by paying advances at 
the end of the previous season. The intermediary, brick 
kiln owner, and worker become tied together through a 
system of advances.
Workers reported living from advance to advance, feeling 
trapped: ‘I feel like I am never getting out of this. I borrow 
350,000 NPR [approx. US$3,000]. I go from season to 
season. My advance runs out before the season starts, 
which means I have to take an advance to live, and that 
I have to go to the brick kilns to work’ (female worker at 
brick kiln, Kathmandu Valley). Employers and the labour 
intermediary agreed that they are trying to lock people 
in: ‘If I don’t give an advance nobody will come to work. 
I have to give an advance to make sure that we can 
produce the orders for which we, [the] owners, have been 
given an advance’ (brick kiln employer). Intermediaries 
can make money through brokering but they also risk 
losing advances when people take an advance and 
run away. 
The trajectory and the roles of moneylenders and labour 
intermediaries was found to be very different from that of 
young girls entering the AES. Unlike the brick kiln sector, 
workers and survivors of CSEC in the AES come from 
multiple source communities across Nepal. In addition, for 
most girls the migration to Kathmandu was not seasonal 
and often semi-permanent: there was no clear end date 
in their planning. While women and girls reported needing 
money to pay their own or family members’ bills, and also 
reported borrowing money, they mentioned many sources 
for acquiring this: friends, room-mates, family members, 
microcredit, their employer, and only in rare cases an 
informal moneylender. None of the women reported going 
to a moneylender to borrow money, including those who 
said they had high debts. The credit opportunities of 
women and girls in the AES appear to be quite different 
from brick kilns, or other sectors – such as agricultural 
work in Nepal. 
The role of traditional kinship and an extended network 
of friends is significant – most girls described how they 
came to Kathmandu because they wanted to leave their 
village and knew somebody in the city who said they 
could stay with them, or help them find a job. Contacts 
Figure 1: Pathways from village to Kathmandu: the role of informal labour intermediaries in 
recruiting women and girls into the AES
Source: Authors’ own.
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and discussions often took place by mobile phone without 
parental involvement, although some came independently 
to Kathmandu to work or stay with a family member 
based on a joint family discussion that involved parents 
and caretakers. Being alone or feeling lonely and a dislike 
for their first job often drove the girls to look for something 
better, which usually meant entering the AES. 
Girls who found a decent job would inform and possibly 
invite other girls in the village to join her. What one girl 
perceives as decent might not be what others think 
qualifies as such. This depends on the criteria people 
use, and there is a margin of miscommunication there. 
Job offers and opportunities can be initiated by the 
working girls who reach out to their contacts or vice 
versa. They may receive a bonus from an employer for 
helping to find new employees, but this did not seem 
to be the primary motivation. Rather, the connections 
look more like a version of LinkedIn (a service for 
professionals): an exploding network of migrating 
friends and relatives who link to various jobs in the AES. 
There is no single organisation or ‘master mind’ at the 
centre, but a complex web of overlapping connections 
that includes multiple intermediaries and employees. 
The key difference between this network and LinkedIn 
is its informal and hidden nature. This reflects both the 
informal, marginalised, and stigmatised nature of the 
AES, and the fact that there are illegal aspects of the AES 
(i.e. sex work) and aspects which involve coercion and 
the involvement of minors (CSEC). 
In Kathmandu’s rapidly changing urban context, 
increased interconnectivity through social media allows 
for ever widening networks that facilitate the recruitment 
and employment of girls further afield. 
We are seeing young women and girls from different 
parts of Nepal now coming into the Valley. There 
are Nepalese [sic.] girls in India and the Gulf. We 
also learn about Nepali girls working in sex work in 
places that are new to us such as Kenya. How do 
they get there? People have mobile phones and 
they are finding new ways to reach and connect 
these young women. (NGO researcher) 
4.3 Social norms in the AES and beyond
There is no narrative, social norm or traditional practice 
in Nepal which justifies or supports the employment of 
children in sex work. Being beautiful is important, and 
often being beautiful is conflated with youth, but this does 
not equate to all employers, customers or workers finding 
it morally acceptable for minors to be present in the 
AES. Research has highlighted the patriarchal nature of 
Nepali society where discrimination against women and 
girls is highly institutionalised (Stallard 2014), and where 
traditional practices and norms, such as child marriage, 
have contributed to the commodification of children for 
sexual pleasure (Davis 2004). Further, recent evidence 
from research suggests that some male customers do 
actively seek under-18s because they find them more 
fun, beautiful, and compliant (Risal and Hacker 2018). 
But none of these co-relations add up to being able to 
make broad claims about social norms in Nepali culture or 
about employers or customers in the AES.
From our scoping visits there appear to be norms about 
gender and sexuality that justify sexual harassment 
of young single women who are working in the AES in 
Nepal. As a result, minors have to engage in sexually 
exploitative environments where they are subject to 
abuse: ‘People view women like us badly. Customers 
shout at us when they are drunk. We are just serving food 
and drinks. We don’t want this kind of abusive treatment. 
We just want to work’ (dohori bar worker). This complaint 
of waitresses being harassed is shared by many 
waitresses in many other countries (Hackman 2017; 
Giuffre and Williams 1994; Huebner 2008; Zarkov and 
Davis 2018), highlighting broader issues with patriarchy, 
masculinity, and femininity. 
The AES is a growing sector and competent, disciplined 
workers who are skilled, for example, in communicating 
with clients, can make good money compared to other 
sectors. Some young women and girls describe the 
AES as an enjoyable sector to work in because of the 
opportunities to meet people, entertain, and make trips to 
new exciting places at the expense of customers seeking 
the company of a good-looking girl. However, while some 
are able to effectively navigate this context by asserting 
themselves where necessary and utilising their own 
individual agency, harmful social norms make the sector 
risky for many others: 
I had discipline. I saved. I did not drink a lot. I made 
sure I ate well and slept. That is why I could save 
and I now have my own hotel. I introduced my 
daughter to a dance bar but she did not like it. So 
she does not work there. If you can do the work it is 
fine. The worst part of the job is the harassment by 
drunk customers, verbally and physically. (Former 
dance bar worker) 
For the owners and managers of venues, the AES 
provides an investment opportunity in a growing sector, 
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within a context that offers few economic opportunities. 
They need workers that do the job and can deal with the 
demands of their customers. Allowing an environment 
where harmful social norms lead to the harassment and 
abuse of young girls can be lucrative for some employers, 
especially as some customers actively seek out (new) 
young girls (their lack of education and age making them 
easier to dominate and control). Building up relationships 
with clients takes time for new workers in any sector. The 
illegal status of sex work makes it particularly difficult 
for girls who are engaging in sex work to organise and 
protect themselves.
Venues that accommodate these kinds of customers 
tarnish the whole AES. Many employers are eager for 
the sector to change and become more professional, 
perhaps also because it hurts them as individuals, 
parents, and employers to be involved in a sector that 
has a poor reputation. Those associated with dohori 
restaurants in particular (including owners and workers) 
widely agree about the need to make the entire AES more 
respectful and change the current norms which adversely 
affect workers: 
I want to offer entertainment for clients that fit their 
budget and tastes. I do not want drunken customers 
who harass the girls. I want a professional business 
where clients can enjoy Nepali music and have a 
good night out. As a chair of the Dohori Association 
I want the norms in this sector to change and also 
to show how it has already changed. Members 
in the association have worked to improve the 
establishments. We want to offer good quality 
entertainment and promote Nepali culture. The 
norms have already changed and we are getting 
more organised. Some venues are still employing 
children and minors. This is not acceptable and has 
to stop for the whole sector to grow and benefit. 
(Dohori owner, chair of the Dohori Association)
More generally, sex work, including sex work by minors, 
is a public secret in Nepal. Public silence is enabled 
by social norms on gender, masculinity, and sexuality. 
Gender norms result in a narrow set of expectations for 
young women: ‘Girls are supposed to marry and take 
care of their children in the village. Sex before marriage 
is looked down upon’ (NGO staff member). These norms 
can lead to young girls facing discrimination beyond the 
AES. For example, upon arrival in Kathmandu unmarried 
girls have difficulty renting accommodation, which means 
they have to share it with others (who may help or harm 
them, or both). Not having citizenship documentation 
can also be an issue in being able to rent, getting a bank 
account, and accessing other services.
It is difficult for girl to find a rental space. House 
owner don’t [sic.] trust them. This means that most 
of the girls say that they are married and show 
the house owner random men as their partner. 
We need to make the work in [the] AES respected 
and dignified work… Girls from well family 
background[s] are also in [the] AES. So this is not 
only about [being in a] poor economic situation, but 
about culture and social norms. (NGO Programme 
Manager working in the AES) 
The sense of shame associated with sex work, in 
addition to its illegal status which criminalises women 
and girls, contributes to the public silence around 
sex work and CSEC in Nepal. The silence has to be 
reproduced by intermediaries and underage victims of 
trafficking. Reintegration of survivors into their families 
and communities is often conditional on the survivors and 
their families maintaining this silence. There are economic 
and emotional consequences for not doing so: survivors 
may be ostracised from the community, seen as unfit for 
marriage, and have fewer employment and/or education 
opportunities. Survivors are blamed and bear the burden 
of this silence.
In public discourse, sex work is often associated with 
particular groups or types of women. Rumours and some 
written accounts single out certain villages, ethnicities 
(such as the Tamang), or physical characteristics (such 
as light skin), which are seen to make some young 
women and girls more likely than others to work in the 
AES. These views reflect much older socioeconomic 
and political hierarchies based on ethnicity and caste 
established during the Shah regime (1768–2008). Pahari 
Hill Hindus of the Khas Gorkha tribe, Brahmin/Bahun 
and Chhetri castes, and certain castes within the Newar 
ethnicity have long dominated certain positions in the 
army, civil service, and judiciary. During the Shah regime 
Nepali and Sanskrit became subjects at school, putting 
those who belong to other ethnicities and speak other 
languages such as Maithili, or languages related to the 
Tibetan-Burmese languages, at a structural disadvantage. 
This history shapes today’s stereotypical attitudes 
towards people from the long-excluded ethnic groups as 
being naive, innocent, unable to ask difficult questions, 
and docile workers who can be easily manipulated. 
However, recent research reveals the ethnic make-up of 
girls in the AES challenges these perceptions (Dank et al. 
2019). During the scoping visits, we also noted a great 
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diversity in the women and young girls we saw and met, 
in terms of their age, image, and physical characteristics. 
Several young women, Nepali and Indian, mentioned 
having difficulties obtaining identity papers – and it is 
noteworthy that this included a female manager in a 
high-end dance bar. 
I’m from a rural area. My parents did not know 
how to register me at birth and we have bad 
relationships now. To get these papers I have to 
pay 3,5 lakh [US$3,000] in bribes. Without these 
papers many things like renting a house or getting a 
bank loan are difficult for me. I am stuck. (Manager, 
dance bar)
Narratives that single out a particular ethnic group 
may represent an ‘internal orientalism’ which is well 
documented among other minorities in Asia such as the 
Hmong in Vietnam (Huong, Oosterhoff and White 2011). 
Such narratives can be a way of attributing the shame 
of sex work to the most marginalised/poor ethnic groups 
of Nepal, allowing dominant national groups to distance 
themselves from any association with the sector (Gibson 
2003). It can also be a form of patriarchal punishment 
by these dominant group(s) of matrilocal or matrilinear 
communities such as the Tamang for transgressing 
dominant gender norms, as has been found in other 
communities in the region (Oosterhoff, White and 
Huong 2011).
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5 DISCUSSION
Approaches that focus on CSEC face a number of 
challenges, as the research conducted so far highlights. 
The scoping exercises reveal the complex characteristics 
of the AES: an informal, fragmented and diverse business 
landscape, concentrated in many different parts of 
Kathmandu. Those operating in these areas may be 
employing children, but not directly involved in CSEC. 
Conflating different services and employers, and treating 
the AES as one homogenous sector where CSEC is 
ubiquitous is inaccurate. It also stigmatises already 
socially marginalised, poorly regulated, and poorly 
protected businesses.
The boundaries of the umbrella term ‘AES’ are not 
clear. AES can refer to a certain area or a cluster of 
‘entertainment’ venues such as cabin restaurants, dohori, 
and exotic dance bars. The presence of other businesses 
operating in close proximity – small groceries, clothing 
stores, and shops selling other basic items – makes it 
difficult to target or tailor activities and to develop a more 
detailed understanding of the political economy of a 
particular sector within the AES. In addition, facilitated by 
the use of mobile phones and social media, arrangements 
and transactions can take place outside of the venues 
typically associated with the AES, resulting in parts of the 
sector being increasingly hidden. An understanding of the 
complexity of the AES and the challenges this brings is 
essential. Targeted approaches are needed that focus on 
a specific type of service within the sector, where there is 
documented evidence of CSEC. 
Many interesting initiatives on social collective change 
(rather than individual behaviour) have been taken to 
combat child labour in different sectors. Unfortunately, 
robust documentation and evidence on their impact 
are often lacking (Oosterhoff et al. 2018). The export-
oriented segment of the carpet sector is often mentioned 
as an example where WFCL was successfully reduced. 
Customers of large companies such as IKEA became 
more aware of the use of child labour in carpet 
production, partly in response to campaigns of NGOs 
and the media. In Nepal a multi-stakeholder collaboration 
involving NGOs, policymakers, and law enforcement 
agencies worked with carpet producers to eradicate child 
labour in these shops. 
This is an example of a sector where we have 
overall been quite successful. You can go into 
these shops yourself in the valley and you will not 
find large numbers of child labourers – as was 
the case before. We can learn some lessons from 
this in terms of collaborations for better policy 
implementation. (Policymaker, Labour Office 
Kathmandu) 
However, the carpet sector also reveals the unintended 
consequences of interventions, and the need for child-
centred approaches to programming. For example, the 
policymaker noted that some children ‘ended up in front 
of the temple begging’ once the carpet industry began 
changing its practices around child labour. Approaches 
need to recognise that some children may desire or need 
to work: ‘We need to have a holistic approach that also 
looks at the family background and what these children 
really want’ (policymaker, Labour Office Kathmandu).
There is a need to define the objectives of the different 
parts of the AES such as the dance bars. 
Why are dance bars existing? By which act or law? 
There is needed a regulatory body to monitor their 
activities like [the] Tourism Board of Nepal which is 
regulating all hotel[s] of Nepal. (Government official, 
Department of Labour, Labour Office Kathmandu)
Within the AES, initiatives for collective action include 
citizen committees of residents in areas with a 
concentration of AES establishments. These committees 
monitor venues together with law enforcement agencies 
or government officials. There are support groups for 
victims of trafficking and CSEC that provide a practical 
and emotional safe support space after rescue and 
rehabilitation. Safe spaces for workers in the AES where 
they can relax and chat before and/or after working hours 
double up as places to access information on a range of 
topics including health and employment rights. 
However, some interventions continue to conflate sex 
work with trafficking. While this is in line with Nepali law 
and policy, this approach results in conflicts with voluntary 
sex workers and can de jure and de facto support the 
involuntary rescue of sex workers. Such approaches 
can cause harm and result in further marginalisation and 
exclusion. For example, the legal conflation of trafficking 
and sex work can result in minors being rescued against 
their will. With few alternative opportunities, this can 
unintentionally result in young girls living on the street. 
It may also lead to women and girls having to engage in 
more risky behaviour within the AES. 
In Cambodia for example, a crackdown on small brothels 
and freelance sex workers led to the sex industry 
becoming embedded within entertainment venues. As in 
Nepal, ‘entertainment workers’ serve drinks to customers, 
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and often drink with them. Sexual services are provided 
outside of the venues, making them ostensibly legal. 
The workers in Cambodia would be required to stay until 
the end of their shifts to maintain the perception that the 
venues had no involvement with the provision of sexual 
services, and there is strong evidence that this resulted 
in excessive alcohol consumption by both clients and sex 
workers. As a result, the risk of violence and unprotected 
sex are more likely as workers have to provide sexual 
services in isolated places (Overs 2013). 
There is a growing body of excellent qualitative and 
quantitative research on customers, source communities, 
victims, and survivors conducted by INGO, NGO, 
national, and international researchers. But the 
scoping visits highlighted important knowledge gaps on 
perpetrators, ‘gatekeepers’, and intermediaries. These 
are often treated as distinct groups of actors, but findings 
suggest a great deal of overlap between the categories:
Street children who get a commission from an 
establishment because they bring in a new 
underage girl for work or a client who buys a service 
are minors. They can be both victim and perpetrator 
depending on the time. In real life the lines are 
blurry. (NGO staff member)
For programming this requires an integrated approach 
to child protection and child welfare that recognises 
that individuals can be victims, survivors, workers, and 
perpetrators across a lifetime – even during adolescence 
– or occur in compartmentalised spaces within a life. 
Individual narratives might differ depending on the time of 
day not because people are hiding or are traumatised – 
although that certainly is possible – but because they are 
navigating between different roles in their life. 
Continued work to understand the complicated networks, 
facilitated by phone technology and social media, that 
allow the recruitment of girls from multiple communities to 
Kathmandu’s AES and beyond is essential. This research 
should explore the roles of different actors within these 
networks and how they interconnect including family, 
friends and neighbours (who may be acting as formal 
and informal intermediaries) in source communities; 
moneylenders; actors such as employers, managers, 
customers and workers within the AES; and those 
occupying the spaces around the AES such as touts, 
pimps, and those engaged in the local economy of a 
particular area. 
Challenging harmful social norms on gender that result in 
sexualised environments where abuse and harassment 
are common is also needed. Harnessing the push from 
relatively significant players in the sector, such as dohori 
and exotic dance bar owners, who can act as industry 
leaders in projecting good practices that help to create a 
respectful and professional sector. Changing the sector 
and its norms is not something that an individual can 
or should be expected to do, or which could be solved 
by raising awareness among the girls. Finding ways 
to challenge the behaviour of customers and break 
the silence which allows CSEC to continue in the AES 
alongside a whole range of other (child) labour abuse will 
be a key step in reducing CSEC in the AES. Improved 
practices promoted by those within the sector, and/or 
improved opportunities for women that mean they do not 
have to engage in the sexually charged atmosphere of 
parts of the AES may lead to improvements for workers 
in the sector relatively quickly. However, changing 
entrenched gendered norms which allow for a culture that 
permits and justifies the harassment and exploitation of 
women and girls may be a slow process.
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6 IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE, POLICY, AND 
RESEARCH 
• Focus on improving the gendered norms around 
sexuality and gender that justify the sexual 
harassment, discrimination, and marginalisation 
of all people working in the AES. Begin by 
harnessing the motivation to change by several 
key stakeholder groups involved in the AES 
(employers, workers (adults and children), 
community, government agencies, and law 
enforcers) and particularly in the dohori sector 
where there is a clear economic and moral 
imperative to improve the working environment. 
• Work with the dohori sector and other 
stakeholders (e.g. workers, performers) to set up 
joint systems to monitor the arrival of new and 
minor-aged girls. The dohori sector already has a 
collective association (the Dohori Association) and 
is interested and willing to collaborate to improve 
the sector and eradicate WFCL. The sector could 
be seen as an industry leader that models best 
practices.
• Break the culture of shame and silence which 
surrounds sex work and the AES. Use successful 
approaches developed in the fields of domestic 
violence, intimate partner violence, HIV, and/or 
from 150 years of feminist labour history to design 
modified evidence-based strategies that tackle the 
social norms that lead to silence. Avoid reinventing 
the wheel by using strategies that have tackled 
similar subjects previously seen as taboo. This may 
include working with survivors’ groups and their 
families; convening law makers and duty bearers 
to explore strategic and practical possibilities such 
as social protection schemes, identity cards, and 
other essential documentation to address broader 
citizenship problems; and mobilise and strengthen 
the capacity of social workers.
• Work with people’s aspirations and strengths for 
their lives and their wellbeing, which includes the 
need to relax and enjoy cultural activities. Avoid 
a focus on what the Diffusion of Innovations 
(DOI) theory (Rogers 2010) would call a focus on 
laggards – people who do not want to change 
– rather than the majority of people. Generate 
creative ideas and innovations in a sector which 
thrives on creativity and human connections. 
• Disaggregate and separate the AES from sex work 
and separate sex work from trafficking. ‘Raid and 
rescue’ missions should be replaced by a system 
that recognises and protects all AES workers. 
Ensure approaches are child-centred and have 
mechanisms that ensure children’s voices are 
listened to, and their needs and desires are taken 
into account. 
• Consider integrating welfare services for rescued 
minors from the AES with services for other 
minors as a way to reduce stigma and recognise 
the need for tailored support for all children.
• Examine how social media and increased 
connectivity are changing the labour recruitment 
into the AES. Rather than seeing the AES as an 
unusual sector, it might be more effective to look 
at it as a lens through which we can understand 
the links between local and global labour markets 
in the digital era, or draw comparisons with how 
a multimedia marketing strategy might work. How 
different are the recruitment strategies into the 
AES from LinkedIn or bitcoin marketing strategies? 
• Examine the interaction between gender norms 
and the political economy of the AES by studying 
the trajectories and interactions of women and 
girls and men and boys into the AES using social 
network analysis (SNA). An effective, innovative 
way to do this would combine digital mobile 
applications with participatory action research 
methodologies. 
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